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Foreword from Berlin
    The Baltic region has the potential of becoming one of the most flourish-
ing, innovative and competitive regions on our entire continent. Cooperation 
within the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS), founded in 1992 on a joint 
initiative between Germany and Denmark, will play a key role in making this 
happen. At the beginning it saw its primary task in helping to overcome the 
gap between east and west after the Wall came down; today the CBSS promotes 
very actively and effectively economic, political, cultural and environmental 
cooperation between the neighbouring nations within the Baltic region. 
    In July 2011, Germany will take over the chair of the CBSS. During our 
presidency, we wish to emphasise the special role the Baltic Sea region plays 
in the confluence of Europe. The focus is on the role of the European Union 
because once Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia joined the EU in 2004, the 
Baltic Sea became an interior sea almost entirely within the EU. One important 
goal is to integrate the CBSS more closely into the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region and its implementation. The strategy aims to help the nearly 100 mil-
lion people living in the Baltic Sea region to close ranks and to benefit from the 
improvement of infrastructure, the sustainable protection of the environment 
and the growing economy. At the same time, the involvement of Russia into 
the activities of the CBSS should be ensured and further promoted. In concrete 
terms, the German federal government intends to focus on increasing practi-
cal cooperation in the area of maritime and environmental policy. 
    Today, as in the past, the Baltic Sea region is very significant for German 
trade. This does not only apply to the federal states on the coast such as 
Schleswig-Holstein, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Hamburg, which 
are becoming increasingly more important trading partners for the Baltic Sea 
States. Germany has an interest in deepening these relationships because our 
nation, as a European hub, benefits as much from advanced/enhanced trans-
portation and energy networks as it does from the improvement of shipping 
safety and the fight against international crime. 
    The study at hand on the macroeconomic significance of the Baltic Sea 
region in the European Union combines comprehensive data on the socio-eco-
nomic situation of the region. It successfully demonstrates and analyses how 
structures are expected to shift according to the regions’ transformation to-
wards a service- and knowledge-based society. Furthermore it exposes arising 
opportunities and potential to economic and political players.  Hence, it makes 
a valuable contribution to the confluence within the Baltic Sea region.
Dr Werner Hoyer
Minister of State
German Federal Foreign Office6





    Looking through a European lens, the Baltic Sea has almost completely 
become an “inland sea” due to the enlargement of 2004. Eight of the nine bor-
dering nations are members of the European Union. In spite of numerous eco-
nomic, ecological and cultural differences, the Baltic Sea States form a cohesive, 
“domestic region”. This makes regional cooperation especially important here, 
acting as a role model for other regions of Europe. But there is still more poten-
tial to be exploited.
    The Baltic Sea has been an area of trade for long. The foundation of the 
Hanseatic League marked the heyday of trade and urban development in the 
region. Now that the division of the area has been overcome, the Baltic Sea 
States have againthe chance to continue this history of success via close links 
of trade and economic projects. 
    With the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region, the European Commission 
has recognised a first specific regional strategy for supporting this process 
through an integrated approach. The aim of the strategy is to coordinate and 
adjust the efforts of diverse players on various levels. The cornerstones of the 
strategy are higher environmental sustainability, prosperity, attractiveness, 
accessibility as well as security.   
    One example is the regional cooperation in the area of energy. In 2008, a 
high-ranking group of observers from Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland and Sweden was initiated and chaired by 
the European Commission. This group prepared the Baltic Energy Market In-
terconnection Plan, a comprehensive action plan for connecting energy grids 
in order to improve the market for electricity and gas. The primary goal is to 
end the relative isolation of the Baltic Sea States in terms of energy by integrat-
ing them into the EU energy market. 
    With the European Energy Programme for Recovery, the first infrastruc-
ture measures could be fostered to improve the infrastructure of the European 
Energy market for the Baltic Sea States. This includes establishing power lines 
between Sweden and Lithuania and between Estonia and Finland. It also 
funded efforts to increase offshore wind energy, such as the project between 
Denmark, Germany, Poland and Sweden. The communication regarding infra-
structure priorities, published in November 2010, stated that the extension of 
electricity and gas pipes  in the Baltic Sea region deserves more attention. 
    The Baltic Sea region can become a role model for innovation of all kinds: 
for example, in the area of renewable energies. To make full use of this poten-
tial, it will be necessary to exploit synergies and mechanisms for cooperation 
more purposefully and strategically. The study at hand offers clear and sig-
nificant alignment in this regard. 7
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Foreword from Berlin 
    From a German perspective, the Baltic Sea stretches all the way to Lake 
Constance. This is caused by the significance of Baltic Sea trade which goes 
well beyond the North German Plain. Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria as fed-
eral states are the largest exporters to the Baltic Sea region, with export figures 
each in the double-digit billions. This study presents validated and illuminat-
ing arguments seeing benefits and opportunities of deeper Baltic Sea coopera-
tion from an overall German point of view. 
    The German federal government has been acting on this maxim for al-
ready some time and understands its engagement in Baltic Sea cooperation as 
more than just beneficial to the neighbouring federal states but rather as an 
important element for European policy as a whole. This deserves the greatest 
recognition but arouses enormous expectations (at the same time) for Ger-
many taking the presidency of the Council of the Baltic Sea States in July. I am 
certain that the German Federal Foreign Office in charge will handle the pres-
idency of the CBSS successfully. The study does an impressive job demonstrat-
ing that we will have to work together to find solutions for the great chal-
lenges faced within the Baltic Sea area of innovation. 
    The example of Baltic Sea cooperation clearly shows what cross-border 
civic involvement can achieve once trade is made an integral element. The 
Hanseatic League goes back to a network of organised interest groups - first 
business people and later the cities around the Baltic Sea. Hence civic players 
are to be seen behind the success stories of the “new German” cluster in terms 
of knowledge and economy, which are discussed in the study, there are civic 
players. 
    We are thankful to the Hamburg Chamber of Commerce for commission-
ing this study together with our institutional partner Federal Foreign Office 
and Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWI). Looking at Eu-
rope’s integration through the precise lens of the Baltic Sea, it was extremely 
worthwhile considering the highly informative and profound findings gained 
thereby. We also express our gratitude to the supporters representing business, 
politics and society.  
    As president of the European Movement Germany (EBD), with more than 
200 German civic member organisations which see themselves quite purpose-
fully as a network and therefore form the largest think tank for European 
policy in Germany, I regard the civic cooperation to be an extraordinary exam-
ple of transferring ideas to reality.  The scientific analyses are supplemented 
by personal perspectives of experts from the European movements in Finland, 
Latvia and Germany. 
    However this study should not close the chapter on this issue. It rather 
lays the cornerstone of the dense network of partners, companies, institutions 
and associations recognising the potential and challenges in the Baltic Sea 
region in order to influence development sustainably. As a co-initiator of this 
“Baltic Sea network”, the European Movement Germany looks forward to dis-
cussing the study findings with its partners in Germany and Europe – grant-
ing the region a new, powerful momentum for its future. 
Dr Dieter Spöri
Former Minister, President of the 
European Movement Germany (EBD)
 8
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Foreword from Hamburg
    Ladies and Gentlemen, 
    Hamburg has been the westernmost port in the Baltic Sea and the south-
ernmost Scandinavian port since back in the day of the Hanseatic League. One 
thing has not changed since: the many economic interconnections between 
Hamburg and the rest of the Baltic Sea region. This study takes an in-depth 
look at these important topics (for Hamburg). 
    The role of cities as initiators within the Baltic Sea region is examined in 
one chapter of the study. Hamburg’s sister city arrangement with St Peters-
burg is especially significant in this context. It is not merely the scientific and 
cultural exchange between the two metropolises which invigorates the Baltic 
Sea region, but the economic impetus from the close trading band as well. The 
port of St Petersburg, accessible via the Baltic Sea, is the entryway to the north-
ern markets. Hamburg is an essential hub for this access. 
    Container handling for the “Baltic Tigers” over the Port of Hamburg grew 
by 39% in the third quarter of 2010 compared to Q3 2009. Figures could hardly 
show greater economic momentum in the Baltic Sea region. This contempo-
rary growth will be tested by demographic change, as the study impressively 
demonstrates. While some of the south Baltic Sea states can expect enormous 
emigration, some Scandinavian cities anticipate growth of up to 22.5%. Ham-
burg, as a centre of knowledge, is well connected to all Baltic Sea states and 
intends to be strongly involved in conquering the upcoming challenges, as the 
example of this study shows. 
    The fixed link across the Fehmarn Belt will be a breakthrough for the 
close exchange between the metropolis of Hamburg and Scandinavian coun-
tries and universities. The macro-region is already competing for the finest 
brains. An excellent transportation infrastructure will lead to shorter path-
ways between locations. Establishing networks between companies and uni-
versities will be eased. In addition to the interconnection between business 
and science, the five sponsors of the study demonstrate the foresightedness 
inherent in the Hanseatic business community. I thank the sponsors and in-
stitutional supporters of this study, because the newly created network would 
not have been possible without this work.
Dr Karl-Joachim Dreyer 
Vice President of the 
Hamburg Chamber of Commerce9
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Summary
    The Baltic Sea states Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Poland, Russia and Sweden make up a diverse community of states with 
enormous potential along their interior border to the European Union (EU) and 
to Russia. The eight EU countries with direct access to the Baltic Sea have a po-
pulation of around 147 million people, which is a share of 29% of the total EU 
population. These states produce 29.3% of the EU gross domestic product (GDP), 
indicating their economic importance to Europe. The study at hand analyses the 
development possibilities of the Baltic Sea region from various perspectives. It 
deals with the current situation, the potential and the future challenges. There-
by this study puts its focus on trade in the Baltic Sea area, demographic trends, 
capacity for innovation and the economic impact of the cities in this area. 
    The exchange of goods is essential for the cross-border integration of EU 
states, and the Baltic Sea states are important trading partners. Exports from 
this region amounted to EUR 725 billion in 2009, which is 33% of the total intra-
EU exports. In the same year, the countries with direct access to the Baltic Sea 
were the destination of 30% of all EU imports, with a total value of EUR 993 
billion. The federal states within Germany also have intense trade relation-
ships with the Baltic Sea region. None of them send less than 6% of their total 
exports to this region and import at least as much back. These trade relation-
ships are expanding rapidly. For example, exports and imports between the 
federal states in northern Germany and the Baltic Sea states rose significantly 
between 2002 and 2009. Trade with Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania has 
more than doubled and the increase for Hamburg was about 40%. For Russia, 
St Petersburg plays an important role as a Baltic Sea port because it connects 
the markets in central Russia to the EU. 
    Dealing with future demographic changes at the societal level will be a 
major challenge for the countries in the Baltic Sea region. Forward-looking be-
haviours are important for tackling issues such as a decline in the population 
overall and of those of employable age, as well as an ageing society and labour 
force. In the Baltic Sea states (excluding Russia), the labour force was 67 million 
strong in 2009. This accounts for 30.9% of total employment within the EU. 
Since 1999, the number of jobs in these countries has increased by 6.1%, which 
illustrates the trend towards an increasing need for labour in this economic 
area. Having sufficient availability of labour in future is fundamental to en-
suring the ability of the region to continue to perform economically. Common 
initiatives among the Baltic Sea states to improve cross-border job market in-
tegration therefore represent a significant option for handling demographic 
change and the risk of an insufficient labour force. A few examples are the 
cross-border recognition of educational and vocational qualifications and the 
expansion of cross-border transportation infrastructure, such as the fixed link 
across the Fehmarn Belt. There is additional potential in the better integration 
of women and seniors into the job market and in sister city arrangements, such 
as the one between St Petersburg and Hamburg. Additionally, the conditions 
for job market integration within the EU have been improved by 1 May 2011 by 
liberalising free movement of labour from Eastern Europe. 11
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    One critical prerequisite for the Baltic Sea region being able to compete 
globally in future is ensuring its technological capability and innovative pow-
er. This requires a broad knowledge base and the ability of its inhabitants to 
adapt to innovation. It should be emphasised in this regard that the number 
of inhabitants with tertiary degrees in Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania 
and Sweden is above the EU average. Between 26% (Lithuania) and 31% (Fin-
land), the level of education is correspondingly high. Another very good ap-
proach to tapping into the potential in this knowledge economy is in the al-
ready well advanced specialisation on knowledge-intensive services and 
research-intensive industries in numerous parts of the Baltic Sea region. How-
ever, the research and development capacities, the knowledge-intensity of 
production processes and the innovation in the countries in the eastern part 
of the Baltic Sea region all show how much catching up they have to do. 
    The cities in the Baltic Sea region in particular offer good conditions for 
innovation and the expansion of their knowledge-based economies. The con-
centration of research facilities, universities and highly qualified labour force 
in these cities is high, and this is the basis for knowledge-based structural 
change. Moreover, the regional development processes in the Baltic Sea region 
are encountering more and more urbanisation. In large parts of the Baltic Sea 
region, the population and production are concentrated in a few cities. This is 
particularly true of the Baltic nations, with 25% of the national population   
living in Vilnius, 31.7% in Riga and 38.9% in Tallinn. 
    Given the pivotal importance of cities for the socio-economic develop-
ment in the Baltic Sea region, their sustainability is critical to ensure the com-
petitiveness of the entire region. Even rural areas can benefit from the deve-
lopment of dynamic cities, as their economic power has a positive impact on 
the surrounding countryside. The future of the Baltic Sea region therefore de-
pends a great deal on the solutions found in the urban centres to face demo-
graphic challenges, on how knowledge-based structural change is handled 
there, and on how well these centres are integrated into the global economy. 
Such trends bring challenges, but they also offer opportunities and further 
potential. The countries in the Baltic Sea region could benefit from these trends 
in future. Strategic collaboration between people and the common pursuit of 
socio-economic strategies which reflect the regional relationships and the 
particular features of the region are important prerequisites for this to happen.12
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1 | Introduction
    The Baltic Sea states Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithu-
ania, Poland, Russia and Sweden represent a diverse community of states. 
They constitute a specific economic and living area with strong potential for 
integration along the interior borders of the EU and with Russia. With the 
exception of Russia, the countries with access to the Baltic Sea are all part of 
the EU and, with around 147 million inhabitants, they account for 29% of the 
population of the EU. These countries generate 29.3% of the GDP of the EU 
Member States. This makes the area a significant economic region in Europe 
whose specific structure and history offers numerous opportunities for de-
velopment. The special importance of the Baltic Sea region in Europe is also 
the subject of the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region endorsed by the Euro-
pean Commission in 2009. The cornerstones of this strategy are to make the 
Baltic Sea region more environmentally stable, safe and secure, prosperous 
and accessible. 
    The strategy includes an action plan with 80 flagship projects, some of 
which are already under way. Some examples of these flagship projects in-
clude turning the Baltic Sea region into a model region for clean shipping, 
mitigating and adapting to climate change, removing hindrances to the inter-
nal market in the Baltic Sea region, and establishing a common Baltic Sea re-
gion innovation strategy (cf. European Commission, 2009). It is worth noting 
that this concept represents the first comprehensive strategy of its kind at the 
macro-regional level the EU has developed. The European Commission also 
emphasises the significance of regional cooperation between players in the 
Baltic Sea region for the success of the Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. 
    When developing strategies in general, it must be borne in mind that the 
conditions for socio-economic development in the Baltic Sea region will change 
over the next decades. The ongoing structural change towards service and 
knowledge societies, innovations, the intensification of economic intercon-
nections in global goods, services and labour markets, the increasing integra-
tion of neighbours within the Baltic Sea region and the demographic change 
will all have considerable influence on the region. Such trends bring challen-
ges, but they also offer opportunities and further potential. The countries in 
the Baltic Sea region could benefit from these trends in future. Strategic   
collaboration between people and the common pursuit of socio-economic 
strategies which reflect the regional relationships and particular features of 
the region are important prerequisites for this to happen. 
    In the following, various facets and special features of the Baltic Sea re-
gion will be shown to describe the current situation, the potential and the 
challenges the region will face in future. There are chapters dedicated to the 
meaning of trade in the Baltic Sea region (Chapter 2), the challenges of demo-
graphic changes (Chapter 3), the prospects for the region as an area of innova-
tion (Chapter 4), and the pivotal role of the cities there as initiators for the de-
velopment of the entire Baltic Sea region (Chapter 5). A more narrow regional 
definition of the Baltic Sea region is the federal states of Schleswig-Holstein, 
Hamburg and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania for Germany; the Western 
Pomeranian, Pomeranian, Warmian-Masurian and Podlaski voivodeships in 
the north of Poland; and St Petersburg and Kaliningrad for Russia. Because of 
Exploit the advantages of proximity13
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Figure 1
their geographical circumstances, the remaining countries in the Baltic Sea 
region are treated in their entirety in the analysis (cf. Figure 1).
 14
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2  |  Trade with the Mare Balticum 
    Back during the day of the Hanseatic League, between the middle of the 
12th and the middle of the 17th centuries, maritime transport made it possible 
for regions with access to the Baltic Sea to trade goods with each other exten-
sively. These advantages in the interregional exchange of goods made being 
located on the sea or on a river a critical factor for the economic development 
of a city. The ongoing integration of the worldwide economy will offer the 
ports in the Baltic Sea region particular potential in future as well, especially 
for the maritime industries and related businesses. The intensification of trade 
and transport cost advantages tend to strengthen the spatial concentration of 
economic activities in favour of locations near the sea (cf. Ott et al. 2010). 
    According to empirical studies, the costs of transporting goods from one 
region to another increase by 20 to 30% when the two regions are twice as far 
apart (cf. WTO 2004). This correlation helps us to understand why interna-
tional trade relationships tend to be more intense, the smaller the distance 
between the trading partners is. For one, this explains why trade within Eu-
rope is more important for the EU Member States than trade outside Europe (cf. 
Großmann et al. 2006) and why the neighbours within the Baltic Sea region 
have intense import and export trading relationships with each other. Other 
reasons for the intense interconnection are the spatial proximity, the histori-
cal bonds between the new federal states and the nations of Eastern Europe 
and the traditional economic interconnections between the Hanseatic cities.
     The neighbours within the Baltic Sea region are important trade partners 
for the EU Member States. In 2009 they exported goods worth EUR 725 billion 
to other EU nations, equal to 33% of exports within the EU. Adding trade out-
side the EU, this share increased to 34% or a total of EUR 1.1 trillion (all figures 
excluding Russia). Altogether the Baltic Sea states imported goods worth EUR 
993 billion in 2009 (28% of them from countries outside the EU), accounting for 
30% of total imports to EU countries. For the sake of comparison: the Mediter-
ranean Sea states (Greece, France, Spain, Slovenia, Malta, Cyprus and Italy) 
accounted for 25% of EU exports and 29% of EU imports.
Potential for port cities from
 ongoing integration
Intensive trade links in the 
Baltic Sea region15
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The history of the Baltic Sea region 
»On the so-called Mare Balticum or Baltic Sea, battle has seldom been for 
mastery of the sea, but has rather been a war for the coastline. The Baltic 
Sea has always served more to connect the surrounding nations than to 
separate them. Sea transport was and is cheaper, more comfortable and 
faster than the land routes. Even today, there are no motorways which con-
tinue the entire length of the Baltic Sea coastline. It was rare that a foreign 
fleet managed to play an important role in the Baltic Sea – the Dutch and 
the English are really the only two, and even then it was only for a short 
time – and since the Viking era, no Baltic Sea state has ever been a naval 
power.
The common history of the Baltic Sea region began as the Kingdom of Den-
mark, which had already encompassed Norway and Iceland since the early 
Middle Ages, grew stronger and began to expand. In addition to southern 
Sweden, it conquered Gotland and the area which is now Estonia. Legend 
has it that it was during this conquest that Denmark obtained the Dan-
nebrog, the oldest state flag in the world still in use. Things were going very 
badly for King Valdemar as he attempted to conquer Tallinn; falling to his 
knees, he prayed to God for a sign and promised to have his army baptised 
in return. God sent the white cross on a red background fluttering down 
from heaven and the Danes were victorious. The white cross on a red back-
ground is still the coat of arms for the city of Tallinn. 
Back then, Denmark’s greatest foe was not a hostile kingdom but rather the 
Hanseatic League. It was considered the binding force in the Baltic Sea re-
gion, though this was only true to a point. No Danish cities were members 
of the Hanseatic League and Denmark was its greatest adversary in the 
Baltic Sea region. 
Under the leadership of the Danes, the kingdoms of Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and parts of Finland and Estonia, which belonged to the Swedish 
crown, were brought together into the Kalmar Union (1397-1523). The Stock-
holm Bloodbath committed against the Swedish insurgents marked the de 
facto end of the union in 1520. Future king Gustav Eriksson Vasa fled Stock-
holm for Mora on snowshoes – the “Wasa Run” is now a famous long-dis-
tance ski race – and then gathered troops to successfully defeat the Danes, 
which led to the re-establishment of the Kingdom of Sweden.
Vasa’s victory had significant repercussions for Europe. Too broke to repay 
a loan from the city of Lübeck, Vasa decided to act on the advice of his coun-
cillors, that is, to expropriate the belongings of the Catholic Church and 
convert to Protestantism. The consequence was that Sweden became Prot-
estant, saving the lives of many German Protestants during the Thirty 
Years’ War.
The Tsardom of Russia appeared on the Baltic Sea during the Great North-
ern War (1700–1720) and its importance continued to grow until the end of 
the First World War, as it conquered first the Baltic provinces of Estonia and 
Livonia as well as Riga, then later Courland and finally Finland in 1814. By 
1918, the situation in the Baltic Sea region had changed drastically. Finland, 
Estonia and Lithuania had become independent states, and Latvia was 
composed of southern Livonia, Courland, Riga, Latgalia and Zemgale. Ger-
many lost land to Poland, and Gdańsk became a free city administrated by 16
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the League of Nations. Denmark expanded its territory up to its current 
border near Flensburg. 
After the Second World War, the Baltic Sea was divided into areas under the 
control of the Soviet Union and NATO. The three Baltic States and north 
eastern Prussia went to the Soviet Union, while Poland and the later GDR 
became socialist republics. Finland was forced to adopt a neutral foreign 
policy and Sweden also remained neutral. Denmark and later the Federal 
Republic of Germany became members of NATO. Another consequence of 
the Iron Curtain, which then divided the Baltic Sea, was that German was 
replaced as the lingua franca and language of scholars around the interior 
sea by Russian in the east and English in the west.
Once the Soviet system collapsed in 1989 and the three Baltic nations be-
came independent, the freedom of Finland to choose its own foreign policy 
and the transition of Poland to a democratic system made it possible for the 
EU to expand into the Baltic Sea region: first to Finland and Sweden in 1995 
and then to the other neighbouring states in 2004, with the exception of 
the Russian Federation. The Baltic Sea had become a de facto EU interior 
sea«.
Ernst Johansson, Attorney-at-Law 
President of the Deutsch-Nordischen Juristenvereinigung and 
Vice-President of the Europa-Union Deutschland
Mr Johansson represents the European Movement 
Schleswig-Holstein on the board of the 
Network European Movement Germany. 
    Germany plays a critical role in trade on the Baltic Sea. In 2009, it ex-
ported goods valued at EUR 75 billion to the Baltic Sea region and imported 
goods worth EUR 70 billion. It is an important purchasing and sales market for 
most Baltic Sea states, though some regions within Germany are targeted 
more than others. Tables 1 and 2 show the importance of trade on the Baltic Sea 
for the German federal states in terms of value. Berlin, Brandenburg, Mecklen-
burg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-
Holstein and Thuringia show the most intensive trade links to the Baltic Sea 
states. They import between 12.7% (Lower Saxony) and 50.3% (Brandenburg) of 
their goods from this area. One-fifth of the exports of Brandenburg, Saxony-
Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein go to the Baltic Sea region. Mecklenburg- 
Western Pomerania even settles 26.5% of its foreign trade there. Brandenburg 
and Saxony-Anhalt trade relatively a lot (exports and imports) with Poland 
and Russia. Schleswig-Holstein is closely linked to the Kingdom of Denmark 
due principally to its geographic proximity. This is also true of Mecklenburg-
Western Pomerania, which draws 31.7% of its imports from Denmark and 
sends 27.2% of its exported goods there. Sweden is another important trade 
partner of Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, getting 27.6% of the exports of 
the federal state. 
    Even federal states which are far distant from the Baltic Sea, such as   
Bavaria and Baden-Württemberg, have clear trade links to the Baltic Sea   
region. This is partly due to the strong exports of the automotive industry in 
these southern German federal states. Tables 1 and 2 show that no federal   
state posts less than 6% of exports to or imports from the Baltic Sea states. 17
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Table 1  
BW BY BE BB HB HH HE MV
Exports to Baltic 
Sea area
Mill. €   10 735   10 683   1 463   2 080    655   2 430    4 254   1 342
   Share of Denmark % 14,2 10,9 6,7 8,8 14,2 20,5 11,3 27,2
   Share of Estonia % 1,1 1,7 0,8 0,8 2,3 0,8 1,1 0,3
   Share of Finland % 9,8 9,9 4,1 4,5 6,7 5,7 7,7 4,2
   Share of Latvia % 0,9 1,0 0,9 0,8 1,5 1,5 1,0 0,6
   Share of Lithuania % 1,6 1,8 5,2 0,9 1,4 1,0 1,5 1,4
   Share of Poland % 29,0 31,0 30,7 62,3 40,9 30,1 34,9 21,0
   Share of Sweden % 18,9 21,0 11,8 7,1 18,8 13,2 18,3 27,6
   Share of Russia % 24,6 22,9 39,8 14,8 14,2 27,2 24,2 17,7
Share of export to 
Baltic Sea area
% 8,6 8,6 13,9 19,5 6,1 7,8 9,9 26,5
NI NW RP SL SN ST SH TH
Exports to Baltic 
Sea area
Mill. €   7 664   16 554   2 945    971   2 516   2 012   2 924   1 124
   Share of Denmark % 17,6 14,7 13,6 6,0 10,9 12,5 44,7 12,2
   Share of Estonia % 1,2 0,9 1,0 0,5 0,6 0,8 1,8 0,9
   Share of Finland % 7,7 7,6 9,0 8,1 4,6 4,4 5,9 5,2
   Share of Latvia % 1,3 0,7 0,9 0,3 1,4 0,8 0,8 2,8
   Share of Lithuania % 1,7 1,5 1,8 1,3 1,1 1,3 1,4 1,6
   Share of Poland % 31,4 34,9 36,5 35,8 49,7 57,3 18,0 42,7
   Share of Sweden % 18,7 17,1 17,3 21,5 11,3 9,6 16,2 13,4
   Share of Russia % 20,5 22,5 20,0 26,5 20,5 13,3 11,1 21,2
Share of export to 
Baltic Sea area
% 13,5 11,9 8,4 8,7 12,9 19,6 19,5 12,5
Sources: Federal Statistical Office (2010); calculations HWWI.
Exports: German states to Baltic Sea area 2009
German states
1
1 BW = Baden-Württemberg; BY = Bavaria; BE = Berlin; BB = Brandenburg; HB = Bremen; HE = Hesse; MV = 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania; NI = Lower-Saxony, NM =   North Rhine-Westphalia; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; 
SL = Saarland; SN = Saxony; ST = Saxony-Anhalt; SH = Schleswig-Holstein; TH = Thuringia  
    Hamburg trades 7.8% of its imports and exports (excluding pure port 
handling activities) with the Baltic Sea region. In particular, it exports goods 
to Denmark (31.9% of weight and 20.5% of value), Sweden (19.7% of weight and 
13.2% of value), Poland (32% of weight and 30.1% of value) and Russia (4.6% of 
weight and 27.2% of value). In turn, most of its imports, in weight and value, 
come from Poland (about 527 million t and EUR 1.1 billion) and Russia (about 4.1 
billion t and EUR 1.5 billion). These are primarily the container trade of high-
value goods with Russia’s former capital of St Petersburg and raw materials 
with Vyborg and Vysotsk. 
    Figures 2 and 3 show the development of trade in value terms between 
the federal states in the Baltic Sea region and the Baltic Sea states during the 
period from 2002 to 2009. A significant decline in the imports and exports of 
Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Schleswig-Holstein during 2008 and 
2009 can be seen following the financial and economic crises, whereas Ham-
burg’s imports only shrank marginally.18
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Table 2
Figure 2 
Expansive development of trade in 
Baltic Sea region 
 
BW BY BE BB HB HH HE MV
Imports from 
Baltic Sea area
Mill. €   6 734   10 542   1 394   5 615   1 420   4 206    3 823   1 364
   Share of Denmark % 9,5 6,2 8,8 3,4 20,9 13,4 11,4 31,7
   Share of Estonia % 0,9 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,8
   Share of Finland % 10,5 4,0 5,4 2,8 6,8 4,5 6,8 12,5
   Share of Latvia % 0,5 0,7 0,2 0,1 0,9 0,4 0,5 0,8
   Share of Lithuania % 1,4 1,0 1,4 0,6 0,9 4,3 1,2 3,9
   Share of Poland % 32,7 26,3 62,9 21,6 26,8 25,2 41,7 29,2
   Share of Sweden % 24,1 8,9 17,7 1,9 20,5 15,1 17,8 10,4
   Share of Russia % 20,3 52,5 3,4 69,5 22,6 36,7 20,1 10,8
Share of imports 
from Baltic Sea 
area
% 6,2 9,6 16,3 50,3 13,1 7,8 6,5 39,7
NI NW RP SL SN ST SH TH
Imports from 
Baltic Sea area
Mill. €   7 808   15 406   2 248   1 043   2 486   4 314    5 492    975
   Share of Denmark % 17,7 15,4 13,6 3,7 7,1 1,6 44,6 12,0
   Share of Estonia % 0,9 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,4 0,6
   Share of Finland % 7,9 9,5 4,8 1,3 2,8 1,0 12,9 2,3
   Share of Latvia % 0,7 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,6 0,2 0,2 0,8
   Share of Lithuania % 1,8 1,7 0,8 0,7 0,8 0,8 1,8 3,2
   Share of Poland % 40,7 36,5 28,9 24,4 38,0 13,7 7,9 37,1
   Share of Sweden % 12,9 14,7 14,9 26,7 6,0 3,8 22,3 8,7
   Share of Russia % 17,4 21,2 36,2 42,7 44,6 78,7 9,8 35,3
Share of imports 
from Baltic Sea 
area
% 12,7 10,4 10,1 10,8 17,9 46,7 32,2 16,9
Sources: Federal Statistical Office (2010); calculations HWWI.
Imports: German states from Baltic Sea area 2009
German states
1
1 BW = Baden-Württemberg; BY = Bavaria; BE = Berlin;  BB = Brandenburg; HB = Bremen; HE = Hesse; MV = 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania; NI = Lower-Saxony, NM =   North Rhine-Westphalia; RP = Rhineland-Palatinate; 
SL = Saarland; SN = Saxony; ST = Saxony-Anhalt; SH = Schleswig-Holstein; TH = Thuringia  
    Overall, exports and imports between the federal states named and the 
Baltic Sea states increased from 2002 to 2009. The strongest growth in trade 
was posted by Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania. Hamburg’s trade rose by 
more than 35% during the same period. Altogether, the trade of the three   

























Sources: Federal Statistical Office (2010); calculations HWWI. 19
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Figure 3 






















Sources: Federal Statistical Office (2010); calculations HWWI. 
    One important determinant of the future trade relationships in the Baltic 
Sea region is the development of the national gross domestic products, because 
these influence trade volumes. The growth prospects of the individual Baltic 
Sea states vary. For example, Finland’s real GDP will rise by 2% in 2011 accord-
ing to an IMF forecast. The growth forecast for Germany is also 2%, while the 
Baltic nations are expected to grow annually by more than 3%. The strongest 
growth is projected for Poland and Russia, whose economies should expand by 
3.7% and 4.3% by 2011. The IMF forecasts global trade volumes will grow by 7% 
by 2011, then on average by 6.9% from 2012 to 2015 (cf. IMF 2010). The Baltic Sea 
states will benefit from this, as they show a good basis for development over-
all. For example, export volumes in Estonia are forecasted to grow on average 
by 10% through 2011, and by 9% in Germany (cf. OECD 2010).
    The increase of trade in the Baltic Sea region will also mean further ex-
pansion of maritime shipping, because ships are a main form of transporta-
tion here. For example, in 2008 the proportion of maritime shipping was 84% 
in Estonia, 89% in Latvia and 67% in Lithuania (cf. Bundesamt für Güterverkehr 
2009). The expansion of maritime trade will create challenges for environ-
mental protection but it should also be a trigger for innovation. New technolo-
gies for maritime shipping can be developed and employed which protect the 
sensitive interior Baltic Sea. There are already numerous initiatives to protect 
the environment (cf. Box 1), including those under the scope of the EU Strategy 
for the Baltic Sea Region. For example, the Baltic Sea region should become a 
model region for clean shipping and nutrients inputs to the sea should be re-
duced to acceptable levels (cf. EU 2010). While this should reduce the environ-
mental pollution of the Baltic Sea region, it will also impair the competitive-
ness of shipping, which might lead to shifts in the distribution of freight 
transport among the various options.20
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Box 1
Environmentally friendly ships
Numerous ports, including Gdańsk, Gothenburg, Hamburg, Klaipeda, Riga, Tallinn 
and Stockholm, have joined forces in the World Ports Climate Initiative (WPCI). The 
aim of the initiative is to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from ports and there-
by improve air quality. Cruise ships are the primary generators of emissions, vibra-
tions and noise as they provide light, heat and electricity of all kinds to their pas-
sengers, even in port. At present, these ships deliver most of their electricity needs 
when anchored using the ship engines, which burn heavy oil. This was the motiva-
tion for a recommendation in 2007 to set up more environmentally friendly shore 
side power supply via electrical connections, which create far less noise and vibra-
tion. Within the Baltic Sea region, the ports at Gothenburg and Lübeck are fore-
runners in this regard, already advancing this form of electricity supply. Kiel is 
working on employing and installing this technology as well. The Port of Hamburg 
is also a role model, offering lower port fees to environmentally friendly ships 
starting in 2011 (cf. Tiedemann 2010). 
Moreover, the port association between Le Havre, Antwerp, Rotterdam, Bremen 
and Hamburg promotes the development of a unified Environmental Ship Index 
(ESI) to classify ships by their emissions (cf. World Ports Climate Initiative 2010a). 
At present, ships may not use fuel with more than 1.0% sulphur content in so-
called Sulphur Emission Control Areas (SECA). The North Sea and Baltic Sea are the 
only SECA sailing areas in the world. The limit in all other waters is 3.5%. Within 
the scope of Marpol, the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) lowered the 
limit for sulphur content in the control areas to 0.1% to protect the ecosystems of 
the North Sea and Baltic Sea. 
Valid starting in 2015, the agreement might merely shift transport to land means, 
since the use of oil distillates in shipping is considerably more costly. Within the 
Baltic Sea region, the Institute of Shipping Economics and Logistics (ISL) (2010) 
expects this change to shift 600,000 units annually from maritime transport to 
trucking. The land routes from Western Europe to Russia and the Baltic nations 
already compete with shipping and their position should improve as maritime 
transport becomes more expensive, as it is expected to do. As an alternative to 
the 0.1% limit, the ISL proposes the maximum sulphur content be reduced to 0.5%, 
which would not change the transportation cost ratio between the various carri-
ers materially.
Container handling in maritime 
hub-and-spoke routing
    The hub-and-spoke routing strategy is meaningful for the structure of 
maritime logistics in the European sailing waters. The largest ports in Europe, 
Antwerp, Rotterdam and Hamburg, function as hubs for the Baltic Sea region. 
From there, the goods are transported to smaller ports using feeder ships. 
These small feeder ships travel regularly on a fixed schedule while larger ships 
are used for the longer distances. This allows companies to benefit from   
economies of scale, as moving larger volumes at a time lowers the transport 
costs per unit. It also reduces the travel time for large ships, because they do 
not have to enter every port. The hub-and-spoke strategy is also necessary in 
the Baltic Sea because many smaller ports are not equipped for the entrance of 
large container ships and tankers. 
    In Hamburg this hub-and-spoke strategy is especially important for the 
Baltic Sea because many goods from Southeast Asia are redistributed here. 21
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Figure 4
Figure 5
For example, within the intermodal transport chain, Hamburg accounts for 
about 26% of goods in maritime feeder shipping, 54% of truck freight and 19% 
of rail freight (cf. German Federal Statistical Office 2010). The Port of Hamburg 
is the central point in Germany for the transfer of goods for overseas transport. 
The Hanseatic city of Hamburg mainly profits from container handling. The 
proportion of parcelled goods transported by container rose from 71% in the 
1990s to 97% in 2009. Figure 4 shows the global position of Hamburg’s con-
tainer handling activities (ranked 15th). In 2009 about 7 million containers 
were handled in Hamburg. This is about 3.5 times less than Singapore, the   
largest container handling ports in the world, but about 5 times larger than   





























































Sources: HPA (2010); calculations HWWI.22
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Promote short sea shipping
Container trade expands further
Locations for container ports      St Petersburg is the largest container port in the direct sailing waters of 
the Baltic Sea. It handled about 1.3 million containers in 2009. After the Russian 
city, which is the second largest city in Russia after Moscow, second place goes 
to Gothenburg. The port at Gothenburg has various locational advantages to 
the one at Stockholm. It is free of ice year round and can quickly be called at by 
ships from Rotterdam and Hamburg without having to travel through the 
North Sea-Baltic Sea Canal or around northern Denmark through the Skager-
rak. Furthermore, Gothenburg, the second largest city in Sweden with a catch-
ment area of nearly 1 million people, sits directly on a railway junction which 
reaches Stockholm, Malmö, Copenhagen and Oslo. 
    The greatest growth among the container ports in the Baltic Sea during 
the period from 2005 to 2009 was posted by Gdańsk (+244%). This represented 
an increase of 170,609 containers in 2009. Gdańsk was followed by Lübeck, 
with an increase of 18%. Nonetheless, the two ports began from a low base, 
which explains their high growth rates. Lübeckwas primarily specialised in 
trade with paper and cellulose from Finland, Sweden and Russia. In addition, 
roll-on / roll-off ferries travel from Lübeck to these three countries and the 
Baltic nations. Looking at the development between 2008 and 2009, however, 
container handling at Lübeck fell by 82,722 standard containers, a 33% decline. 
This is why the Hamburger Hafen Logistik AG (HHLA) abandoned the con-
tainer terminal it had been operating in Lübeck since 2002 and discontinued 
the container railway connection between the two Hanseatic cities (cf. Beh-
ling 2009). 
    In the period from 2008 to 2009, the main shipping areas of the Hanse-
atic city of Hamburg posted a strong decline due to the economic and financial 
crises. The most dramatic decrease was seen in the Port of Hamburg’s con-
tainer handling for Baltic Sea shipping (-44%). The improvement in the world-
wide economy was already showing positive effects on global trading in 2010 
with the corresponding boost to the ports. The handling of seaborne goods 
recovered relatively strongly in Hamburg during the first nine months of 2010. 
The port posted an increase in turnover of 8%. This means the September vol-
umes were up 10% year-over-year. Quarterly trade volumes had rebounded 
year-over-year particularly well for container traffic with Russia (+15%), Poland 
(+19%) and the Baltic nations (+39%).
  The European Commission is currently implementing an initiative to 
promote short sea shipping within the scope of European transportation poli-
cy (cf. European Commission 2001 and 2009). It is aiming to set up a 14-point 
plan, including the harmonisation of guidelines for intermodal transporta-
tion. The Baltic Sea states, with their long coastlines, should benefit from such 
a plan. As part of the plan, new lines should be laid and expanded between 
smaller ports and between the hubs and the smaller ports. These measures 
should take some of the pressure off of other transportation means, such as 
railways and motorways. This strategy to develop transportation routes is 
highly relevant for improving the infrastructure in the Baltic Sea region, be-
cause there are relatively few onshore connections between the countries 
there. 
    The infrastructure should be further improved through large projects, 
such as the fixed link across the Fehmarn Belt (cf. Box 2). Such infrastructural 
measures improve the underlying conditions for economic activities and 
cross-border integration. There will also be a future need for investment in 
numerous areas within the Baltic Sea region to improve their accessibility. 23
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Box 2
The Fehmarn Belt fixed link connects
At the end of 2008, the Federal Republic of Germany and Denmark signed a   
treaty for a fixed link across the Fehmarn Belt. At the start of 2011, the Danish 
government decided to build a tunnel rather than a bridge for the rail and road 
traffic between Fehmarn Island in Schleswig-Holstein and Lolland in Denmark. 
The construction of a fixed link should connect to the north-south axis of the 
Trans-European Transport Network. The costs for the project are forecast to be 
EUR 5.6 billion. Denmark will bear the entire costs of not only the construction of 
the tunnel but the connections to the hinterlands of the kingdom’s sovereign ter-
ritory (ca EUR 4.8 billion). 
Germany will finance the costs for the connections within Schleswig-Holstein (cf. 
German Bundesrat 2009). The hinterland connections to be built or expanded 
should be 4-lane for road traffic and 2-lane for electric rail traffic. Building the land 
connection will reduce the travel time from Hamburg to Copenhagen from 4.5 to 
3.5 hours. The fixed link will have a positive influence on the cross-border labour 
market integration between Germany and Denmark and the possibility of com-
muting. However, the decisive stimulus is not expected to come until there has 
been a significant shift in residential areas and jobs towards the Fehmarn Belt (cf. 
Barten et al. 2006). At present the directly affected potential source regions are 
relatively sparsely populated. The German federal states have diverse positions 
regarding the project. For example, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania is worried 
about a decline in employment in favour of locations with ferry routes to Sweden. 
In contrast, Schleswig-Holstein sees the construction as an opportunity to posi-
tion itself as a hub between the Copenhagen and Malmö regions and Hamburg. 
Denmark predicts that the project will contribute about EUR 402 million to wel-
fare over the duration of 50 years (cf. Economics Aps and Prognos AG 2004).
These include, for example, the railway connections for freight transport in the 
east-west corridor from France over Germany, Poland and the Baltic nations, 
to Russia and in the north-south corridor (Rail Baltica) from Tallinn in Estonia 
to Warsaw in Poland (cf. BAG 2010, European Commission 2001, 2007).24
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3  |  Demography and labour market integration
Figure 6 
Reduction in number of people of 
employable age 
    In the Baltic Sea states (excluding Russia), the labour force was 67 million 
strong in 2009. This is 30.9% of the total in the EU (cf. Eurostat 2010). Since 1999, 
the number of jobs in these states has risen by 6.1% (cf. Figure 6), which illus-
trates how the need for labour force in this economic area is tending to grow. 
Only Russia and Lithuania are outside this trend. Having a large enough la-
bour force is essential for the future economic development of the Baltic Sea 
region. It is closely tied to the changes in the number of inhabitants of employ-
able age, which will foreseeably decline in the coming decades as part of the 
























Change of labour force from 1999 to 2009
Sources: Eurostat (2010); OECD (2010); calculations HWWI.
¹ from 2000 to 2009
    These demographic changes are the result of a continuous increase in life 
expectancy, low birth rates and regional differences in migration movements 
(cf. Table 3). Fertility rates in all Baltic Sea states are below the “conservation 
level”, which is an average of 2.1 children per woman. Denmark, Estonia, Fin-
land and Sweden show high fertility rates above the EU average (1.6). In the 
other countries, fertility rates vary between 1.31 and 1.54. At only 1.36 children 
per woman, the fertility rate in Germany is particularly low (cf. Table 3). 
    The life expectancy in Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden is much 
higher than in the countries in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region. How-
ever, the life expectancy there has also been continuously rising since the start 
of the 1990s, mainly due to better environmental, employment and nutrition-
al conditions. It is approaching the level found in the western states. In 2000, 
for example, the life expectancy at birth in Estonia was 65.1 years for men and 
76 years for women. By 2009, these figures had risen to 69.8 years for men and 
80.1 years for women. At an average of 81 years for both genders, Sweden has 
the highest life expectancy.25
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Table 3
Emigration represents an enormous 
challenge for the Baltic nations
New provisions since 1 May 2011 
 
Fertility rate migration balance
2009 1998 – 2008²
Men Women Men Women
Denmark 1,84 74,3 79,0 76,5 80,8   120 502
Germany 1,36 75,4 81,2 77,3 82,5  1 223 305
Estonia 1,62 65,1 76,0 69,8 80,1 -11 647
Finland 1,86 74,1 81,0 76,5 83,1   80 566
Latvia 1,31 64,9 76,0 68,3 78,1 -30 457
Lithuania 1,55 66,8 77,5 67,5 78,6 -46 272
Poland 1,40 69,7 78,0 71,5 80,1 -200 050
Russia 1,54 59,0 72,3 62,8 74,7   479 707
Sweden 1,94 77,4 82,0 79,4 83,4   351 418
EU 27³ 1,60 74,5 80,9 76,1 82,2 not specified
¹ For Germany data from 2002
² Estonia: from 2004 till 2008; Russia: from 2005 t ill 2008
³ Fertility rate from 2008; Expectancy of life from 2002 and 2007
Sources: Eurostat (2010); Federal Statistical Office (2010); calculations HWWI.
Demographic indicators
Expectancy of life at birth in years
          2000¹          2009
    Migration movements are a critical factor for cross-border labour market 
integration in the Baltic Sea region. At the same time, it differentiates the pro-
cess of demographic change between the countries. While the Baltic nations 
and Poland have had to deal with great losses due to emigration over the last 
ten years, the countries in the western part of the Baltic Sea region are a desti-
nation for immigrants. The pattern within the Baltic Sea region therefore 
shows people migrating from low-wage countries to those which offer high 
wages. The EU Act of Accession stipulates that the EU-15 Member States may 
only suspend the freedom of movement of workers from the countries which 
joined the union in 2004 until no later than 1 May 2011. Germany is one of the 
few countries which decided to extend the restriction from 1 May 2009 to 30 
April 2011. For Germany, this means that during this period of time citizens of 
the newer Member States are subject to the Immigration Act like immigrants 
from other countries, and thus need a work permit.
    The provisions for labour market integration in the EU changed on 1 May 
2011 when complete freedom of movement for people (and freedom to provide 
services) was instituted. Immigration forecasts indicate that up to 240,000 
people could migrate annually from the more recent EU Member States (ex-
cluding Bulgaria and Romania) to the EU-15 through 2020. The same forecasts 
indicate that around 190,000 will immigrate from Bulgaria and Romania into 
these EU countries annually through 2020. By the year 2020, the number of 
immigrants in Germany could rise by about 1.8 million persons, meaning net 
annual migration of 175,000 persons. Predictions suggest that Germany will 
benefit less than other countries from the migration of highly qualified work-
ers from Eastern Europe, increasing numbers of which will emigrate to the US 
and the UK (cf. Brücker et al. 2009). For example, since 2006, more Polish work-
ers in total have emigrated to the UK than to Germany. In 2009, however, the 
migration preferences of the Poles shifted away from the UK and towards Ger-
many (cf. Iglicka 2010). It remains to be seen what repercussions opening up 
the German labour market will have.26
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Challenges of demographic change
»In many countries, hardly any challenge for the future has been discussed 
at such length and with such intensity as the issue of demographic change. 
Some would claim that, ‘the issue cannot be mastered without clear migra-
tion policies’, while others attempt to react to the issue by raising the age 
of retirement and lowering the age at which people start working. But are 
these the only options?
There are actually countries in the Baltic Sea region with rising birth rates. 
Strategic family policies, including ‘salaries for mothers’, kindergartens 
and other offers for families, have led to exciting results in many northern 
countries like the Baltic nations. There are manifold approaches and fo-
cuses in the Baltic Sea states – but which are the most effective? Which are 
best suited to the 21st century? 
Naturally, there is not only one correct solution, but we need to keep think-
ing outside the box and trying to find and implement the best options. Few 
doubt that the retirement age needs to be lifted, but this is only a part of 
the complex demographic puzzle. How will we handle migration? Do we 
prefer more EU-internal immigration or from other countries as well? And 
how do we prevent EU-internal labour migration from leading to a situa-
tion where one’s meat is another’s poison? What if the targeted poaching 
of qualified labour in its country of origin – for example, Latvia – created 
enormous problems? 
Unfortunately, I have more questions than answers. Nonetheless, there is 
hope that many active citizens, companies and politicians in the neigh-
bouring regions of Europe, like around the Baltic Sea, see the opportunity 
in these difficult times to learn from each other, to share their experience 
across borders, and to develop true partnerships. This is something even 
large and wealthy Germany can learn from small but ambitious Latvia«.
Andris Gobins 
President of the European Movement Latvia
Member of the European Economic and Social Committee
Member of the Latvian Government’s Cooperation Council and the
Organised Civil Society in Latvia 
Declining population numbers in 
many places
    The consequences of the past low fertility rates and losses due to migra-
tion in the Baltic nations and Poland can clearly be seen in the population 
trends between 1998 and 2008 (cf. Figure 7). While Sweden reported growth of 
3.8%, the population in these countries declined. The population in Germany 
hardly changed, with an increase of 0.2%. Altogether, population growth in 
the Baltic Sea region is below the EU average (+3.5%). 
    The demographic trends of the last several years should continue in fu-
ture. This means the population is getting both smaller and older. Eurostat 
forecasts that only Denmark, Finland and Sweden will show strong popula-
tion growth in the next twenty years (cf. Figure 7). Populations will shrink, 
primarily in the countries in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region, espe-
cially Latvia (-9.6%). It must be noted, however, that the assumed future migra-
tion numbers are critical parameters for the findings of population forecasts. 
If the countries which are projected to lose population are able to stem emigra-27
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Abbildung 7
Ageing labour force influences 
economy
tion, this would decelerate the rate of population decline. Their success in this 
will depend largely on these countries’ ability to develop economically, on fu-
ture wage levels, and on the extent to which additional jobs can be created. 
    It is not only the number of people of employable age which is shrinking. 
The age distribution will also change. The proportion of people of working age 
under 45 years old will tend to diminish. In the eastern countries, this is fore-
cast to shrink between -7.9 and -24.3% (cf. Figure 8). In general, the decreases 
in and ageing of the number of people of employable age presents a challenge 
for the future economic development of the Baltic Sea states. There are em-
pirical studies which suggest a negative correlation between the age of a la-
bour force and its average productivity - especially in industrial occupations 
(cf. Skirbekk 2008; Börsch-Supan et al. 2006). This will have a negative impact 
on the competitiveness of the companies in the Baltic Sea region if steps are 
not taken to positively influence productivity. Ageing employees require a 
suitable work environment which includes life-long learning. The diminish-
ing importance of physical strength in working life and the improved health 
and cognitive abilities of older people leave room for new forms of work or-
ganisation. Ongoing training measures, a gradual reduction in working times 
and flexible wage models are only some of the options for adjusting to a chan-




































Forecast 2010 to 2030
¹ from 2001 to 2009
Sources: Eurostat (2010); OECD (2010); Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (2010); 
Quellen: calculations HWWI.28
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Figure 8
Decelerating the reduction of the 
labour force












































Change of population by age groups 2010 to 2030
15 to 44 years
45 to 64 years
total
Sources: Eurostat (2010); UN (2010); calculations HWWI.
    The Baltic Sea states also have options for countering the decrease in 
available labour force. One central area of action is increasing the participation 
of people from all age groups in the labour force. The average employment rate 
lies between 76% in Denmark and 58% in Poland. Therefore, relevant measures 
at the company and state level are those initiatives which facilitate the com-
patibility of family and career. There are considerable differences at present in 
the employment rates for men and women in the individual countries (cf.   
Figure 9). The Baltic nations are the exception. There is hardly any difference 
in these countries in the employment rates of men and women. And Lithuania 
is the only country studied where the employment rate of women, just over 
60%, is higher than that of men. The differences in Poland and Germany are 
quite serious. The employment rate of women is far below that of men. 
    In regard to demographic changes, it should be noted that expanding the 
cross-border transport infrastructure and making labour markets more flex-
ible promotes more efficient cross-border labour market integration. Commut-
ing across borders opens up the possibility of balancing out the lack of skilled 
labour and regional mismatch in the labour market. Border commuting fur-
thers the relationship between the individual regions and strengthens the 
mobility and flexibility of the available labour force in border regions. Improv-
ing the recognition of education received abroad is essential for this (cf. Box 3). 
Because their degrees are not recognised, immigrants from abroad are often 
employed below their level of qualification, leaving their potential underuti-
lised. 29
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Figure 9 
Labour market integration through 
border commuting
 
















Sources: Eurostat (2010); OECD (2010); calculations HWWI.
¹ from 2008
    Although there are still border hindrances between the countries in the 
Baltic Sea region, some regions have excelled over the last few years through 
rising commuter numbers. A few worth mentioning include Southern Jutland-
Schleswig for Germany and Denmark, the Torne Valley Euroregion between 
Finland and Sweden, and especially the Öresund (or Øresund) region on the 
Swedish-Danish border (cf. Baltic Sea Parliamentary Conference 2009). The ex-
ample of the Öresund region illustrates how overcoming the administrative 
obstacles and creating transportation links can make a significant contribu-
tion to successful cross-border labour market integration (cf. Statistics Den-
mark 2010). The Öresund Bridge between Copenhagen and Malmö, completed 
in July 2000, has contributed significantly to labour market integration be-
tween Denmark and Sweden. 
    From 1997 and 2008, the number of commuters from Sweden to Denmark 
increased nearly ninefold (cf. Figure 10). In 2007, about 18,500 people com- 
muted daily between Denmark and Sweden, 96.6% of whom lived in Sweden 
and worked in Denmark. However, 37% of these commuters were Danish and 
40% were Swedish. This is due to the fact that real estate prices in Sweden are 
much lower than in Denmark. Moreover, the demand for labour and the wage 
level are higher on the Danish side. The demographic changes will intensify 
this trend further, because the population on the Danish side of the Öresund 
region is ageing more quickly. According to Tendens Øresund (2010), the num-
ber of commuters in this region will increase to more than 40,000 by 2025.30
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Box 3
Baltic Education: Promoting cross-border labour market integration
Labour market integration within the EU continues to face border obstacles which 
hinder the mobility of the labour factor. In addition to the lack of language ability 
and the cultural differences, one particularly significant obstacle is that there is 
no cross-border recognition of the vocational education and training of labour 
migrants. Given the demographic change and the risk of a resulting lack of skilled 
labour, it is critical for the Baltic Sea region to increase cross-border labour market 
integration. This is the subject of the Leonardo da Vinci project, “Baltic Education”, 
initiated by the Hanseatic Parliament and co-financed by the EU, created to help 
improve the conditions for labour migration within the Baltic Sea region and re-
duce the obstacles to intra-EU mobility. Representing the Baltic Sea region, the 
cities of Gdańsk, Hamburg, Pori and Vilnius participated in the pilot phase of the 
project. In cooperation with the HWWI, the Hanseatic Parliament developed the 
European Credit System for Vocational Education and Training (or ECVET system) 
for people with professional qualifications in the Baltic Sea region, mainly based 
on an analysis of essential (core) and additional qualifications and the introduc-
tion of virtual “reference occupations”, which describe the optimal qualifications 
for the respective occupation. The group also created rules of procedure for the 
international recognition of vocational education and training. This model for the 
mutual recognition of professional qualifications incorporates the diverse educa-
tional cultures and occupations within the Baltic Sea region. Vocational training 
is addressed appropriately in the results described herein; it was not possible to 
align the content of all vocational general curricula nor was it desirable to make 
all jobs uniform. 



















Commuting between Sweden and Denmark
from 1997 to 2008¹
Denmark to Sweden
Sweden to Denmark
Sources: Statistics Denmark (2010); Ørestats (2010); calculations HWWI.
¹ only people from 102 Danish communities and from 33 Swedish communities31
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4  |  The Baltic Sea area of innovation
Figure 11
Technological capability is the basis 
for the ability of the Baltic Sea region 
to compete
Knowledge – a key resource
»Even on the global scale, the Baltic Sea region is an important centre of 
economic power. Nine per cent of the global gross national product is gen-
erated in this region. For the Federal Republic of Germany alone, trade 
within the Baltic Sea region accounts for 10%, making it more significant 
than trade with the United States and Japan together. 
This economic success is based particularly on the far better than average 
ability to innovate  of the region. With more than 100 universities and re-
search institutes, which are normally very well networked, an area of in-
novation has been created in the Baltic Sea region of global importance. 
And the roots of this go way back. Nicolaus Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, Carl 
von Linné, Immanuel Kant, Søren Kierkegaard, Niels Bohr and many others 
    Ensuring its technological capability and power of innovation is an im-
portant prerequisite for the Baltic Sea region being able to compete with other 
regions in the global market in future. The extent of these factors in turn   
depends, among other things, on the availability of qualified labour and on 
research and development activities. The number of people with a tertiary 
education (higher level professional and vocational training, higher level tech-
nical schools, universities of applied sciences, universities and colleges) in 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Lithuania and Sweden is higher than the EU aver-
age (cf. Figure 11). Between 26% (Lithuania) and 31% (Finland), the level of edu-
cation is correspondingly high. Among the Baltic Sea states, Poland and the 
Baltic nations have the greatest proportion of inhabitants which have com-
pleted their (upper) secondary education. At 82.1%, Lithuania shows the great-
est proportion of inhabitants who have completed either their (upper) second-
ary education or their post-secondary non-tertiary education (cf. Figure 11).
 











Population between 15 and 64 by educational level 2009¹
Tertiary education Secondary education Primary education not specified
Sources: Eurostat (2010); calculations HWWI.
¹ Data for Russia not available32
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lived and conducted their research in this area, and it is no coincidence that 
the Nobel Prizes have been awarded there every year since 1901.
If education is the most important resource for innovation, then the Baltic 
Sea region is in an excellent position for global competition. This was dem-
onstrated by PISA, and every other international study in the last several 
years has confirmed it, too. The region also benefits from the fact that, ig-
noring national borders, the feeling of living in a common area of coopera-
tion has permeated it since the times of the Hanseatic League. 
The best example of this natural and very successful cooperation is doubt-
lessly the Øresund region, which has become a healthcare technological 
centre of global importance. There are also innovation centres in the areas 
of information technology and nanotechnology. But the classic maritime 
technologies still hold a special place in the region and, in terms of shipping 
services, the Baltic Sea region is well positioned to compete with more than 
just the largest container shipping companies in the world«.
Rainder Steenblock 
Former Environment Minster of Schleswig-Holstein
Mr Steenblock represents THE GREENS (party) on the Board of 
Network European Movement Germany.
Strong potential of well trained
 skilled labour 
Figure 12 
    The education indicators demonstrate that there is strong potential in 
well trained people in all Baltic Sea states. The differences between the coun-
tries are considerable looking at the level of employment in the knowledge-
intensive service industry and the research-intensive industries. These indus-
tries are important for adapting innovation and for knowledge-based 
structural change. The level of employment in these industries in Poland and 
































Share of employment in knowledge intensive industries 2008¹
High- and medium technology
manufacturing
Knowledge intensive services
¹ EU 27, Poland and Sweden 2007; data for Russia not available
Sources: Eurostat (2010); calculations HWWI.33
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R&D investment in some countries 
very high ... 
… but there is room to catch up in the 
eastern part of the Baltic Sea region
Table 4 
Successful inventors in the 
Baltic Sea region
    These differing conditions for innovation are also reflected in the indica-
tors found in international comparative assessments of innovation. There are 
four Baltic Sea states among the top 10 countries on the European Innovation 
Scoreboard: Sweden in second place, Finland in third, Germany in fourth and 
Denmark in sixth (cf. Table 4). Estonia, which has significantly increased its 
capacity for research and development (R&D) over the last several years, has 
already reached 13th place. In contrast, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia are ranked 
















2009 2008 2007 2007 2009
Rating % % %
EU 27 - 1,9 1,5 11,7 42,1
Sweden 2 3,8 2,4 29,8 51,2
Finland 3 3,7 3,0 25,1 52,5
Germany 4 2,6 1,7 29,1 47,5
Denmark 6 2,7 2,4 19,4 53
Estonia 13 1,3 1,4 1,7 49,2
Poland 26 0,6 0,7 0,4 36,4
Lithuania 27 0,8 1,2 0,2 45,3
Latvia 30 0,6 0,9 0,8 43,3
Russia - 1,0 1,1³ 0,2 -
¹ 33 countries by comparison
² Human Resources in Science and Technology
³ from 2005
Sources: Eurostat (2010); HWWI.
Innovation Indicators
    The order found on the European Innovation Scoreboard basically mir-
rors the ranking of the countries in regard to the proportion of GDP spent on 
R&D. This amounts to 3.8% in Sweden, 3.7% in Finland, 2.7% in Denmark and 
2.6% in Germany. In Estonia, 1.3% of GDP goes into R&D. In contrast, except for 
Russia (1%), the other countries in the Baltic Sea region spend less than 1% of 
GDP on their R&D capacities, a relatively low amount. 
    It should be positively noted that two EU countries, Sweden and Finland, 
already put more than 3% of their GDP into R&D. Reaching this amount in all 
EU countries is one strategic goal of “Europe 2020”. The European Council cre-
ated this strategy in June 2010 with a focus on promoting research and innova-
tion as well as education. 
    Looking at the R&D investment, regional disparities can be seen in the 
proportion of employed persons who work in science and technical functions. 
The differences between the countries in the western and eastern part of   
the Baltic Sea region in this regard, however, are less than they are for R&D 
spending.
    At present, success at innovation varies considerably among the Baltic 
Sea states (cf. Table 4). Sweden, Finland, Denmark and Germany are among the 
leading “inventors” in Europe and file more patents than the EU average of 11.7 
per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, in Russia and the more recent EU coun-
tries, as in Estonia, patents play a subordinate role for the development of these 
countries as areas of innovation. 34
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Baltic Sea region benefits from 
face-to-face contact
Healthcare industry: cross-border 
cluster formation
    The “east-west differential” among the Baltic Sea states in terms of capa-
city for innovation and the contribution from knowledge-based economies to 
economic development is expected to decrease in future. As part of the catch-
up process in the Baltic nations, Poland and Russia, the R&D capacities in these 
countries will expand and create potential growth momentum. In this regard, 
these economies will benefit from their proximity to the established knowl-
edge-based economies, such as Finland and Sweden. The transfer of knowl-
edge and information depends on the distances involved. The shorter the geo-
graphical distance between countries, the greater their spatial developmental 
dependencies (cf. Niebuhr 2001). One important factor for the transfer of 
knowledge – also across national borders – is face-to-face contact and the cross-
border mobility of the labour force, which should increase as obstacles to mo-
bility are further eliminated. 
    The proximity of companies and the labour force in the Baltic Sea region 
also sets up specific conditions for the development of networks and the crea-
tion of positive network externalities and cluster effects, which constitute an 
important prerequisite for knowledge-based growth. Examples of such devel-
opment potential in the Baltic Sea region are found in the healthcare sector 
and the design and creative industries. The potential innovation in regard to 
the environmental technologies and energy supply is also worth noting. Be-
cause of their growing economic significance and the strong momentum of 
innovation, these industries offer a starting point for development in numer-
ous other industries and the creation of jobs. They provide critical stimulus for 
development in the Baltic Sea area of innovation.
    The healthcare sector is becoming increasingly more important around 
the globe. Some of the driving forces behind this are the increasing life expec-
tancy of the population and the growing demand for healthcare products as 
incomes rise. There are starting points in every Baltic Sea state for the positive 
development of this growth market and this means potential for cross-border 
cluster formation. The significance of this industry specialisation is empha-
sised, for example, by the Nordisk InnovationsCenter, which the three Baltic 
nations are also represented in. Cross-border cooperation can also be seen 
within the scope of Medicon Valley. This is a supra-regional healthcare institu-
tion which assists cluster formation across national borders. It stretches across 
the region around the Danish capital of Copenhagen and the southern Swe-
dish region of Skåne. Altogether, there are more than 300 universities, hospi-
tals and life science companies in Medicon Valley: the biotechnology, medical 
technology and pharmaceutical industries, clinical research organisations 
and research on genetically modified organisms. The regional alliance also 
includes technology parks, investors and other service providers. 
To prevent the R&D findings from being limited to Denmark and Sweden, 
Medicon Valley is linked to ScanBalt, which networks life science and biotech-
nology clusters across the entire Baltic Sea region. 
    Creative and cultural activities, which originate from individual ideas, 
the capacity for innovation and education, are becoming increasingly more 
important for economic development. More than in other states, the cities and 
regions of Denmark, Finland and Sweden have specialised in the creative 
economy and pursue cluster strategies to promote the creative and experience 
economy in particular (cf. Danish Government 2003). Numerous initiatives are 
aimed at promoting specific infrastructure and training skilled labour for this 
industry. The experience economy stretches beyond the cultural and creative 
Networks of leading creative 
economy locations35
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Box 4
European Green Capitals in the Baltic Sea region
The European Commission has been awarding environmentally engaged cities the 
title of European Green Capital since 2009. The initiative was prompted by the fact 
that about 73% of people live in cities and these cities are the primary cause of 
environmental problems such as air and noise pollution. The applications are 
judged according to eleven criteria: the city’s contribution to global climate pro-
tection, local mobility and passenger transportation, availability of local public 
areas, sustainable land use, natural and biological diversity, quality of local ambi-
ent air, noise pollution, waste production and management, water consumption, 
waste water management and environmental management of the local author-
ity. Among the 14 finalists between 2010 and 2013, there have been (or still are) 
4 cities in the Baltic Sea region: Copenhagen, Malmö, Stockholm and Hamburg. 
The first award recipients were cities in the Baltic Sea region: the capital of Swe-
den, Stockholm, won the title in 2010 and the northern Germany metropolis of 
Hamburg was named the European Green Capital in 2011 (cf. European Commis-
sion 2010c). Stockholm won over the jury with its many-faceted concepts for re-
ducing CO2 emissions, recycling and creating local recreation areas. Today, 77% of 
Stockholm residents use the local transport network (cf. European Commission 
2010c). Hamburg’s application focused on climate-friendly urban development, 
among other topics. In cooperation with companies in the region, the use of re-
newable energies in both private households and commercial premises will be 
increased. There are now 60 wind power stations at 12 locations in and around 
Hamburg (cf. Bundesverband WindEngerie e. V. 2010). They contribute to the goal 
of reducing CO2 emissions by 80% by 2050. Further support should come from 
Innovation potential in 
renewable energies
economy to include the areas of sports, tourism, toys and games and edutain-
ment. Strengthening these industries is one of strategic aims of the Nordic 
Innovation Council, appointed by the Nordic Council. As part of this initiative, 
the Nordic countries and the Baltic nations collaborate supra-nationally to de-
velop strategies to promote the experience economy. Among other activities, 
the Nordic Council awards prizes for literature, music, film and innovation. It 
can be said that northern Europe has – with political support – become a grow-
ing market for the creative economy. Moreover, the Baltic nations are increas-
ingly being integrated into this strategy, for example, through the joint deve-
lopment of a model region for the creative economy. Hamburg also has 
partnerships in the Baltic Sea region in the realm of the cultural and creative 
economy. One example is an agreement between the Hanseatic city and the 
southern Swedish region of Skåne. The goal of this cooperation is to initiate 
joint, interregional cultural and creative projects.
    The 20% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2020, as compared to 1990, is one 
of the primary climate targets of the EU. This will mainly come about through 
the increasing usage of renewable energies. Sustainable transport, which can 
help protect the environment, is also an important criterion for choosing the 
European Green Capitals (cf. Box 4). The climate target is also being pursued by 
the “Europe 2020” growth strategy and the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Re-
gion. The Baltic Sea region should become a model region for the environmen-
tally friendly use of energy.36
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expansion of the local transport network and building more environmentally 
friendly bicycle stations throughout the entire city (cf. Free and Hanseatic city of 
Hamburg 2010).
The Baltic Sea region banks on wind 
    The increase of renewable energies requires innovative solutions and 
technologically sophisticated developments, so that the expansion of this in-
dustry can help strengthen the knowledge base in the Baltic Sea. In this regard, 
the increased generation of electricity using wind is very interesting for the 
Baltic Sea region. An overview of the location of the large power plants within 
the Baltic Sea can be seen in Figure 13. The map shows existing nuclear power 
plants, coal-fired power plants with capacity of at least 800 megawatts, oil-
fired, gas-fired and hydroelectric power plants with capacity of at least 400 
megawatts and wind farms with at least 20 wind turbines. Some power plants 
and wind farms which have been approved and are under construction are 
also shown.
    Although there are still a considerable number of nuclear and coal-fired 
power plants in the area shown, it can be seen that the future energy supply 
in the Baltic Sea region will come heavily from renewable energy sources to be 
planned and constructed. For example, a large wind farm will be built in 
northern Sweden. The “Blaiken Wind Farm” should go into operation in 2015 
and output 300 megawatts using 100 wind turbines, thereby supplying about 
30,000 households with energy. This would make the Blaiken Wind Farm the 
largest onshore wind farm in Sweden and one of the largest in Europe (cf. Skel-
lefteå Kraft AB 2010). Denmark is currently planning to build the world’s larg-
est wind farm in Kattegat, which should supply energy to 40,000 households 
(cf. Federal Foreign Office 2010). 
    Developing offshore wind turbines in the Baltic Sea is an important con-
cept for the future renewable energy supply of Mecklenburg-Western Pomera-
nia and Schleswig-Holstein. Wind power is used quite extensively to generate 
electricity on Fehmarn Island (cf. Ministry of Science, Economic Affairs and 
Transport of Schleswig-Holstein 2010). In 2011, Germany’s first offshore wind 
farm in the Baltic Sea, “Baltic 1”, started to operate 16 km north of the Fischland-
Darß-Zingst peninsula in May 2011, with 21 wind turbines for a total capacity 
of 48.3 megawatts. The development of offshore wind energy is proving to be 
a strong growth driver for the industry, creating new jobs for highly qualified 
personnel and new career profiles. The research and development and the ser-
vice and maintenance of offshore wind farms offer potential for the creation 
of new jobs.37
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Figure 13
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5  |  Cities as initiators for the development of the 
      Baltic Sea region
Table 5
Medium-size cities affect 
regional structures 
    Urbanisation plays an increasingly important role in the regional deve-
lopment processes in Europe. Whereas only 51.3% of Europeans lived in cities 
in 1950, this figure jumped to 70.8% by the turn of the millennium. By 2050, 
about 85% of the people in Europe might live in a city (cf. United Nations 2010). 
This means that not only social life, but economic activities are increasingly 
becoming concentrated in the cities – and this is true for the Baltic Sea region 
as well. Table 5 shows an overview of 25 cities in the Baltic Sea region which, 
because of their size and settlement structures, will affect the development of 
their respective regions.
 








Denmark Aarhus Østjylland   242 914   826 923 29
Denmark Copenhagen Byen København   528 208   678 873 78
Denmark Odense Fyn   166 305   484 862 34
Germany Hamburg Hamburg  1 774 224  1 774 224 100
Germany Kiel Kiel, Kreisfreie Stadt   238 281   238 281 100
Germany Lübeck Lübeck, Kreisfreie Stadt   209 818   209  818 100
Germany Rostock Rostock, Kreisfreie Stadt   201 442   2 01 442 100
Estonia Tallinn Põhja-Eesti   397 287   552 282 72
Estonia Tartu Lõuna-Eesti   98 393   326 583 30
Finland Helsinki Uusimaa   583 350  1 423 576 41
Finland Tampere Pirkanmaa   211 507   484 436 44
Finland Turku Varsinais-Suomi   176 087   462 914 38
Latvia Daugavpils Latgale   103 922   339 783 31
Latvia Riga Riga   706 413   706 413 100
Lithuania Kaunas Kauno (Apskritis)   348 624   348 624 100
Lithuania Klaipeda Klaipedos (Apskritis)   182 752   182 752 100
Lithuania Vilnius Vilniaus (Apskritis)   548 835   560 192 98
Poland Bialystok Białostocki   292 428   504 845 58
Poland Gdansk Gdański   451 605   514 420 88
Poland Szczecin Szczecin   398 332   406 307 98
Russia Kaliningrad Kaliningrad Oblast   293 909   937 914 31
Russia St. Petersburg St. Petersburg  4 600 276  4 600  276 100
Sweden Gothenburg Västra Götalands län   507 330  1 569  458 32
Sweden Malmö Skåne län   293 909  1 231 062 24
Sweden Stockholm Stockholms län   829 417  2 019 182 41
Cities in the Baltic Sea area
Soutces: Central Statistical Bureau Latvia (2010); Central Statistical Office Poland (2010); Federal 
Quellen: State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (2010); Statistics Denmark (2010); 
Quellen: Statistics Estonia (2010); Statistics Finland (2010); Statistics Lithuania (2010); Statistics 
Quellen: Sweden (2010); Federal Statistical Office (2010); calculations HWWI.
    The Baltic Sea region mostly features medium-sized cities with between 
98,393 (Tartu) and 829,417 inhabitants (Stockholm). The exceptions are Ham-
burg (1.8 million inhabitants) and St Petersburg (4.6 million), the only two ci-39
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Figure 14
ties in the Baltic Sea region to exceed the 1-million mark. In spite of their dif-
ferences in population size, the cities listed in Table 5 are important urban 
centres for the neighbouring regions, as can be seen in the population figures 
for the territorial unit. The proportion of the territorial unit represented by the 
population of the city varies from 24% in Skåne (Malmö) and 78% in the Grea-
ter Copenhagen Area. In general, differences in the settlement structures 
within the Baltic Sea region can be distinguished (cf. Figure 14). For large parts 
of the Baltic Sea region, the population is concentrated in a few conurbations, 
whereas other regions – especially in the Baltic nations, Finland and Sweden 
– are relatively sparsely populated.
    There are exceptions to this regional pattern, where the agglomeration 
of economic activities and the population stretch out well beyond the city bor-
ders. For example, Riga, Copenhagen and Gdańsk are in relatively heavily pop-
ulated regions, which reinforces their importance as regional development 
sites. In addition to the high population density in the cities themselves, the 
 40
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Cities as motors to the development of the Baltic Sea region
»The influence of the nation states has steadily diminished since the end of 
the Cold War. At the same time, European integration and globalisation ad-
vance the importance of cities and regions. Cities throughout Europe are the 
oldest distinctively European organisms. Whereas the Middle Ages saw the 
creation and development of today’s nation states, leading urban studies 
researchers believe we are seeing a reversal of this 500-year-old process cur-
rently taking place. An open and global economy strengthens cities and 
regions, rather than nation states,  as the decisive parties for creating eco-
nomic growth, development and innovation.
In other words, cities are the key actors in global governance. Even cities in 
secluded areas have the possibility to develop by investing in their knowl-
edge society: in science, innovation and universities. And even small and 
medium-sized cities can be the driving force behind development if they 
collaborate within networks. The Baltic Sea is the most logical common de-
nominator for small and medium-sized coastal cities around the entire 
Northern Dimension of Europe. They can all benefit from the strategic prox-
imity and sharing a region, sea travel space and a network with such “focal 
point” cities around the Baltic Sea as St. Petersburg, Helsinki, Stockholm, 
Tallinn, Kiel, Copenhagen, Riga, Greifswald and Gdańsk. The Baltic Sea uni-
fies all these cities into a common region: ‘Mare Balticum – Mare Nostrum’. 
This is especially true from the Finnish perspective, since Finland is the 
farthest away from the heart of Europe and is connected to it geographi-
cally only through the Baltic Sea.
Partnerships and networks make the difference for regional development 
in a globalised world. The cooperation of 106 cities in the Union of the Baltic 
Cities (UBC) is a good example of a proactive network of cities which can 
only mobilise the shared potential in their common region for democratic, 
economic, social, cultural and environmentally sustainable development 
by working together«.
Arto Juhani Aniluoto 
M. Soc. Sc., General Secretary of the European Movement Finland 
surrounding regions are heavily affected by urban or suburbanisation pro-
cesses. For example, with 2,812.2 inhabitants per km2, the region around Riga 
is more heavily populated on average than the capital of Latvia (2,353.2 inha-
bitants per km2). Gdańsk, with 1,844 inhabitants per km2, benefits from its co-
operation with Gdynia and Sopot to form the Trojmiasto (1,799 inhabitants per 
km2).41
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Baltic Sea cities are the economic 
centres of their regions
Figure 15
    It is the economic and geographic circumstances which increase the sig-
nificance of urban centres as the driving forces behind regional development. 
Successful cities which have a positive influence on their surrounding coun-
tryside are, because of this supra-regional importance, key factors in tapping 
into the growth potential of the Baltic Sea region.  In large parts of the Baltic 
Sea region, the population and production are concentrated in a few cities (cf. 
Figure 15). This is particularly true of the Baltic nations, with 25% of the na-
tional population living in Vilnius, 31.7% in Riga and 38.9% in Tallinn. Further-
more, most of these cities have higher than average GDP per capita: Their pro-
portion of the national GDP exceeds their proportion of the population and 
they generate a significant part of the GDP of the Baltic nations, ranging from 
39.7% (Vilnius) to well over 50% (54.4% in Riga and 59.7% in Tallinn). Cities are 
therefore an important factor for the development of their entire economies.
    The cities of Poland are also exceedingly important for the regional eco-
nomic development processes in their voivodeships. They generate between 
around one-half (Gdańsk) and one-third (Stettin) of the GDP in their respective 
province and, at the same time, are home to most of the population in their 
region. The Finnish capital of Helsinki and its surrounding countryside also 
rank among this list of economic living centres of the Baltic Sea states. At 26%, 
one-fourth of the national population lives there and 35.8% of the Finnish GDP 
is produced there. The proportion of the population of Schleswig-Holstein con-
centrated in Lübeck and Kiel comes to 7.5% and 8.3%, while they account for 
8.6% and 12.2% of the GDP respectively. About 20% of the GDP of northern Ger-
many (Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, Lower Saxony 
and Schleswig-Holstein) is produced in Hamburg, while about 20% of the   












































Proportion of the cities¹ GDP and population compared to the respective 
country
¹ When this study was finalized, Eurostat only provided data for all countries until 2007. Data refer to NUTS-3 
level, exceptional Kaliningrad (NUTS-2) and St. Petersburg (city level). Respective GDP shares refer for  German 
cities to Federal States and for Hamburg to Northern Germany (i.e. Bremen, Hamburg, Mecklenburg-West 
Pomerania), Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein); for Polish Cities to voivodships.
Sources: Eurostat (2010); OECD (2010); Federal State Statistics Service of the Russian Federation (2010); 
calculations HWWI.42
HWWI Policy  |  Report No. 16 
Jobs arising from knowledge-based 
structural change
Figure 16
Dynamic cities in the Baltic Sea region 
are magnets for the labour force 
    The knowledge-based structural change in particular will influence the 
future development of cities in the Baltic Sea region. Looking ahead, labour-
intensive, “dirty” industries will vanish more and more from the urban land-
scape, while knowledge-intensive services, such as architectural and 
engineering firms, advertising, media and cultural industries, business con-
sultants and research-intensive industries are on the path to growth (cf. Blech 
et al. 2008).
    At present, the progress of this structural change varies among the cities 
in the Baltic Sea region, which means the future adjustments required of the 
economic structures there will differ (cf. Figure 16). Cities where services still 
play a subordinate role are found in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea region, 
while the service sector is quite well developed in the other cities. Between 
64.8% (Tampere) and 91.1% (Copenhagen) of the jobs there are in the service 
sector. With few exceptions, the cities are more strongly specialised on ser-
vices than their respective countries and represent national and regional ser-
vice metropolises. In comparison to the rural regions, the cities in the Baltic Sea 
region offer more attractive locational conditions for businesses and employ-
ees within the knowledge-based economy. The level of qualification among 
the population and labour force in urban centres is higher and the educational 
and research facilities and universities are concentrated there. Figure 17 shows 
the location of regular universities and universities of applied sciences within 




































Share of labour force in services 2007¹
¹ NUTS-3 layer; data for Russia not available
Sources: Eurostat (2010); calculations HWWI.
    Because of the locational advantages for knowledge-intensive services 
and research-intensive industries, the increasing importance of knowledge-
intensive industries tends to reinforce the significance of cities as initiators for 
regional growth. In addition, the proximity of companies in cities supports the 
exchange of knowledge and experience between people, which has a positive 
impact on innovations and the further development of technologies. More-
over, the decisions of companies and the labour force regarding where to settle 43
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Figure 17
Knowledge-intensive services on the 
path to growth 
Cities successfully handling 
structural change
influence each other. The labour force chooses where to live and work. The 
availability of a qualified labour force is a relevant factor for companies decid-
ing where to set up business. Thus, demographic and economic developments 
often go hand in hand. Economically successful cities attract labour, which has 
a positive influence on their potential for further development.
 
    Figure 18 shows the proportion of people working in knowledge-inten-
sive services and how this has changed since the turn of the millennium, 
which is an indicator of the momentum of regional structural change. The 
cities of Denmark, Sweden and Finland show the most progress in specialising 
in knowledge-intensive services; in 2000 their specialisation had already 
reached 40% to 65% and it has continued to rise since then. The position of 
Hamburg should also be noted, with its proportion of 40.4% in 2000 and 
growth of 4.7 percentage points by 2007.
    The fact that nearly all cities are successfully managing their structural 
change is positive for the development of the knowledge base in the Baltic Sea 44
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Figure 18
Productivity on the growth track 
region. The German cities are reporting the greatest progress in this regard. In 
addition to Kiel and Lübeck (+4.0 percentage points each), positive develop-
ment tendencies can be seen in Rostock, with an increase of 5.6 percentage 
points, though the Hanseatic city began from a relatively low level. Overall, 
the cities in the Baltic Sea region are observably in the catching up process. In 
the recent past, cities with well advanced knowledge-based economies, such 
as Malmö, Odense, Stockholm, Århus and Copenhagen, are reporting less 
growth in regard to their knowledge-intensive services than numerous other 
cities.
    One indicator of the progress of technological capability is the develop-
ment productivity, as measured by GDP per worker. In accordance with spe-
cialisation patterns and economic histories, the productivity among the cities 
in the Baltic Sea region varies greatly (cf. Figure 19). But all cities in the Baltic 
Sea region are perceptibly growing. At the start of the millennium, the produc-
tivity of Russia was very low, but it has risen between 2000 and 2007 by more 
than 300% (cf. Federal State Statistics Service Russia 2010). Both Kaliningrad 
(EUR 8,071) and St Petersburg (EUR 11,779) were well behind the productivity of 
other cities observed in 2007 and behind the EU average of EUR 47,174. 
    The integration processes in the most recent Member States in the EU 
have caught up considerably in comparison to other EU Member States. Be-
tween 2000 and 2007, the cities in the Baltic nations posted productivity 
growths of 104.2% (Klaipéda) to 135.1% (Vilnius). This is an indicator of the in-
creasing technological capability of the Baltic economies. The cities in Poland 
also managed to improve productivity by 57.5% in Białystok, 57.1% in Gdańsk 
and 40.3% in Stettin. In Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden, productivity 
increased much less, but the cities in these countries already generated more 
than EUR 45,000 per worker in 2000. The front runner is Stockholm, with pro-
ductivity of EUR 85,900 (2007) and productivity growth of 18.3% in the period 

























































Share in 2000 in %
Share of employees in knowledge intensive services 2000, Employment 
growth of knowledge intensive services 2000 and 2007¹
¹ NUTS-2 level; Poland 2004 to 2007; Denmark: NUTS-3 level, 2001 to 2007
Sources: Eurostat (2010); Statistics Denmark (2010); calculations HWWI.45
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Figure 19
Catch-up processes in the 
Baltic Sea region
seven times more productive than Daugavpils, which, at EUR 11,123 per capita, 
is the least productive city in the EU Baltic Sea states. One point which is posi-
tive for the momentum of development in the Baltic Sea region is the fact that 
significant catch-up processes can be observed in the cities of the most recent 
Member States to join the EU. These are supported by, in some cases, very dy-
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Productivity in 2000 and productivity growth from 2000 to 20071
1 NUTS-3 level. The data for EU apply to the years 2002 to 2007. The data for Kaliningrad and St. Petersburg 
are not displayed.
Sources: Eurostat (2010); calculations HWWI.
    In general, economic convergence among the regions, especially in terms 
of per capital income, is a priority of EU regional policy. This catch-up process 
also depends on the ability of these regions to adjust to structural change. 
Figure 20 illustrates how this development can already be seen in the cities in 
the Baltic Sea region under observation. Cities with a relatively high per capital 
income reported lower growth rates in the period from 2000 to 2007. Overall, 
the differences in per capita income are still considerable. It stands between 
7,400 purchasing power standards (PPS) in Daugavpils and 47,800 PPS in   
Hamburg. 
    Given their economic attractiveness, the urban locational factors and the 
manifold job opportunities, numerous cities in the Baltic Sea region increa-
singly draw inhabitants and companies, which further strengthens their ag-
glomeration advantages. Consequently, self-energising regional growth pro-
cesses may arise, during the course of which the importance of cities as centres 
of economic power increases, which exacerbates regional disparities. In addi-
tion to their economic potential, cities benefit here from their cultural attrac-
tiveness and their recreational offering, which has a decisive influence on life 
quality. The European Commission has been giving further incentive for cities 
to improve their cultural drawing power since 1985 by awarding them the title 
of “European Capital of Culture” (cf. Box 5). 46
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GDP per capita in (PPS)² 2007
Income per capita¹
¹ NUTS-3 level; Danish cities: NUTS-2 level
² Purchasing Power Standard (PPS) is a virtual currency unit which eliminates diffenrent price levels 
between countries (Definition, Eurostat).
Sources: Eurostat (2010); Statistics Denmark (2010); calculations HWWI.
    Demographic trends in the Baltic Sea region (cf. Chapter 3) also exert cri-
tical influence on the development of cities. A plentiful offering of qualified 
labour is fundamental for cities to be able to benefit from the potentials of 
knowledge-based structural change in future. Immigration from other re-
gions is important for this condition. Therefore, the cities in the Baltic Sea re-
gion are facing the challenge to position themselves as attractive places to live 
and work in order to successfully compete regionally and internationally for 
qualified labour in future. The concentration of specialised labour in specific 
industries is simultaneously an important requirement for being able to reach 
the “critical mass” necessary for cluster formation in cities. 
    Since numerous cities benefit from immigration, their populations are 
developing more dynamically than the Baltic Sea states overall (cf. Figure 21). 
This is especially true for the cities in Sweden, Denmark and Finland. The front 
runner here is the city of Malmö, which grew by 10.9% between 2002 and 2008. 
It is followed by Odense (9.7%), Stockholm (9.3%), Gothenburg (6.9%), Tampere 
(5.9%), Copenhagen (5.3%), Århus (4.8%) and Helsinki (4.2%). 
    In most cases, the regional population is growing in line with the na-
tional population. For example, the population in the most recent EU Member 
States and in Russia is shrinking. However, Hamburg, Kiel and Rostock are 
growing while the German population overall is shrinking. Another city 
whose population growth deviates from the national figure is Tartu, which 
has grown by 1.7% while the population of Estonia has shrunk by 1.5%. The 
greatest loss is reported by the Latvian city of Daugavpils, whose population 
shrank by -7.5%.47
2011  |  Silvia Stiller, Jan Wedemeier 
The future of the Baltic Sea region: Potentials and challenges
Ensuring the future viability of the 
cities in the Baltic Sea region
Figure 21  
k.A.
































Regional population forecast until 2030
¹ NUTS-2 level; Germany: NUTS-3 level; Finland: City; Kiel and Lübeck: 2008 to 2025
Sources: Statistical Offices of neighbouring countries to Baltic Sea; calculations HWWI.
    Forecasts suggest that most of the numbers shown will not change be-
fore 2030. In particular, the cities of Eastern Europe are losing inhabitants, 
while the regions of Denmark, Finland, Germany and Sweden show favoura-
ble demographic forecasts. Eurostat projects that the populations of these ci-
ties will grow at a rate of 2.5% (Rostock) to 22.5% (Copenhagen). One exception 
here is the city of Lübeck, whose population is estimated to decline by -5.7%. 
The projected trend is also negative for the Russian cities of Kaliningrad (-1.8%) 
and St Petersburg (1.6%), as well as the national population (-2.3%).
    Given the pivotal importance of cities for the socio-economic develop-
ment in the Baltic Sea region, their sustainability is critical to ensure the com-
petitiveness of the entire region. Development in the rural regions can also 
benefit from the dynamic cities, which have a positive impact on the develop-
ment of their surrounding countryside. The future of the Baltic Sea region 
therefore depends greatly on the solutions chosen by urban centres to face 
demographic challenges, to adapt to knowledge-based structural change, and 
to integrate themselves into the global economy. Such trends bring challenges, 
but they also offer opportunities and further potential. The countries in the 
Baltic Sea region could benefit from these trends in future. Strategic collabora-
tion between people and the common pursuit of socio-economic strategies 
which reflect the regional relationships and the particular features of the   
region are important prerequisites for this to happen.48
HWWI Policy  |  Report No. 16 
Box 5
Capitals of Culture: Prestige objects for the Baltic Sea region
So far, 40 cities have been designated the European Capital of Culture for their 
positive contributions to the coexistence of European cultures, to promoting un-
derstanding of the cultural diversity in Europe and to fostering the feeling of Eu-
ropean citizenship. Connecting the cultures of Europe and reinforcing the cross-
border, cultural cooperation are of central importance for making progress in the 
process of European integration. This is now also expressed by the fact that, since 
2009, cities can pair up, one from an older Member State and one from a newer 
one - to jointly apply for the title. The Capitals of Culture should highlight the di-
versity of European cultures while also bringing the citizens of Europe into contact 
with the culture of the award winner. The diversity of locals, migrants and tou-
rists, which distinguishes every Capital of Culture, should help set up multifac-
eted social networks. In this regard, a Capital of Culture has the potential for long-
term cultural, social and economic benefit. A survey among the people in charge 
in the last years found that 80% of them felt that the experience had a positive 
influence on urban development and the life quality of its citizens. In addition, 
being designated a Capital of Culture made the city known throughout Europe 
and put it in the public awareness. This is also the case for the cities in the Baltic 
Sea region, as Turku and Tallinn are the Capitals of Culture in 2011. Furthermore, 
the award will go to the Swedish-Latvian pairing of Umeå and Riga in 2014. In the 
recent past, the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius was also designated together with 
Linz for the year 2009 (cf. European Commission 2010d). 49
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